

TIGER TIPS

RESOURCES FOR AUBURN RESEARCHERS

Managing International Relationships

Global engagement is critical to scientific progress and to solving many of the societal challenges that are borderless. To address these global challenges and to develop new technology, discover new treatments, and deepen our understanding of the world, researchers must collaborate and disseminate knowledge across borders. But these engagements may also present individual and institutional risks. These risks have been highlighted by, among others, members of Congress from both parties, the FBI, the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy. They are also described in detail in the [JASON report on Fundamental Research Security](#) and the [Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans](#) report by the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations.¹

Pursuant to Auburn University's [Guidance on International Relationships and Activities](#) and AU [memo](#) dated February 21, 2019, faculty have an active role to play in ensuring appropriate disclosures and that sponsors made aware of any potential conflicts. It is highly recommended that you take the time to read through this information – specifically the tab “*What do I Need to Do?*”

Through [Grant Information Circular 12-01](#), NASA has had restrictions related to their funding being utilized for collaborations (both funded and non-funded) with The People's Republic of China (or Chinese-owned companies) since April 25, 2011:

*“NASA is restricted by specific applications of Section 1340(a) of The Department of Defense and Full-Year Appropriations Act, Public Law 112-10 (NASA's 2011 continuing resolution), and Section 539 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriation Act of 2012, Public Law 112-55 (NASA's FY 2012 appropriation) from using funding appropriated in the Acts to enter into or fund any grant or cooperative agreement of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company, at the prime recipient level or at any subrecipient level, **whether the bilateral involvement is funded or performed under a no-exchange of funds arrangement.**”*

Starting in 2018, additional agencies started to clarify disclosure requirements and provide more guidance related to “*foreign components*” and we continue to update our Guidance page as updated information is received.

Within the past year, there have been a number of cases related to foreign collaborations and the overarching theme has been related to transparency and appropriate disclosures. The following are recent cases (primarily targeted as “wire fraud”) related to this issue:

[Harvard University](#)

[University of Arkansas](#)

[University of Tennessee](#)

¹ COGR “*Framework for Review of Individual Global Engagements in Academic Research*”